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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1772 
 ___________ 
 
WALTER A. TORMASI, in his individual capacity and on behalf 
of Adavanced Data Solutions Corporation as its 
Representative Ad Prosequendam, 
 




GEORGE W. HAYMAN, Department of Corrections (DOC) Commissioner; JAMES 
BARBO, DOC Director of Division of Operations; MICHELLE RICCI, New Jersey 
State Prison (NJSP) Administrator; JEFFREY BELL, NJSP Associate Administrator; 
JAMES DRUMM, NJSP Associate Administrator; DONALD MEE, JR., NJSP Associate 
Administrator; CHARLES WARREN, NJSP Associate Administrator; DEREK 
BUTLER, Special Investigations Division (SID) Investigator; DOLCE, (First Name 
Unknown), SID Investigator; HARRISON, (First Name Unknown), SID Investigator; 
MAGINNIS, (First Name Unknown), SID Investigator; VICTOR SIERRA, SID 
Investigator; VINCENT  WOJCIECHOWICZ, SID Investigator 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 08-cv-05886) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joel A. Pisano 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 26, 2011 
 Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 










 Walter A. Tormasi, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the order of 
the District Court granting the defendants‟ motions to dismiss.  For the following reasons, 
we will affirm.  
 In December 2008, Tormasi filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on 
behalf of himself and Advanced Data Solutions Corporation (“ADS”), an “intellectual-
property holding company” for which Tormasi is the “sole shareholder” and “authorized 
agent.”  Among other allegations, Tormasi asserted that his constitutional rights were 
violated when prison officials confiscated an unfiled patent application titled “Geometric 
Optical Apparatus Featuring Antiglare Properties.”1  In the complaint, Tormasi stated that 
he “desires to file provisional and non-provisional patent applications with [the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)] based on the invention disclosed in his 
. . . confiscated application,” “that the confiscated provisional application is [his] only 
copy,” and that he is “unable to file patent applications with [USPTO] and thus unable to 
initiate patent prosecution proceedings . . . .”  Tormasi further alleged that he “intends to 
assign his confiscated provisional application and any derivate patents to plaintiff ADS 
. . . .”   
                                                 
1
 According to Tormasi, the defendants also confiscated miscellaneous corporate 
paperwork, patent prosecution documents, several floppy diskettes, and 
correspondence between himself and his attorney.  On appeal, however, Tormasi 
challenges only the confiscation of the unfiled patent application. 
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 Before serving the defendants with a copy of the complaint, the District Court 
dismissed without prejudice all claims asserted by Tormasi on behalf of ADS, noting that 
a corporation may appear in federal court only through licensed counsel.  With respect to 
the allegations concerning the confiscation of Tormasi‟s patent application, the District 
Court concluded that Tormasi failed to state a claim, as he lacked a constitutional right to 
conduct a business while incarcerated.  The District Court also rejected Tormasi‟s claims 
that he had been denied access to the courts under the First Amendment, that he had been 
deprived of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and that he had been denied 
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.  With the District Court‟s permission, 
Tormasi filed an amended complaint.  He reasserted the claims from the initial complaint 
and, for the first time, characterized the confiscation of the unfiled patent application as a 
violation of his right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment.  The defendants 
were served with the amended complaint and filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  The District Court granted the motion, holding that Tormasi failed to 
correct the deficiencies identified in the prior opinion.  With respect to the newly-asserted 
First Amendment claim, the District Court concluded that a prison regulation prohibiting 
inmates from operating a business was valid.  Tormasi appealed.   
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review over the District Court‟s sua sponte dismissal and its order granting the motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim.  Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 
187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  “In 
deciding a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be taken 
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as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and all inferences must 
be drawn in favor of them.”  McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
 In order to establish a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the 
conduct complained of was committed by persons acting under color of state law; and (2) 
the conduct violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of 
the United States.  Galena v. Leone, 638 F.3d 186, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2011).  Section 1983 
does not create any new substantive rights, but instead provides a remedy for the 
violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.  Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 
603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 
(1985)).  Tormasi states that he is raising only one issue on appeal:  whether he 
“possesses the right of access to the [USPTO], either under the „laws‟ of the United 
States (namely, Title 35, U.S.C.) or the First, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments.”2   
                                                 
2
 The defendants argue that the dismissal of the amended complaint should be 
affirmed because Tormasi is asserting the rights of ADS, which, because it is a 
corporation, must be represented by licensed counsel in federal court.  Rowland v. 
California Men‟s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993) (stating that “a corporation 
may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel.”).  We disagree.  
Tormasi brings this appeal on his own behalf and challenges the confiscation of 




 Tormasi claims that the confiscation of his patent application interfered with his 
statutory right to file to apply for a patent and violated his First Amendment right to free 
speech.
3
  Prisoners have a First Amendment right to communicate with others outside the 
prison.  See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989).  It is well-recognized, 
however, that the rights of prisoners “must be exercised with due regard for the 
„inordinately difficult undertaking‟ that is modern prison administration.”  Id. (quoting 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987)). Thus, prison authorities may regulate inmate 
speech so long as the regulations are reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests.  See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.  Indeed, the fact of incarceration and the valid 
penological objectives of deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional 
security justify limitations on the exercise of constitutional rights by inmates.  See 
DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 50-51 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).   
 Here, the defendants confiscated Tormasi‟s patent application pursuant to a prison 
regulation that prohibited “commencing or operating a business or group for profit or 
commencing or operating a nonprofit enterprise without the approval of the 
                                                 
3
 Tormasi also cited his First Amendment right to petition the government for 
redress of his grievances, which includes as an aspect a right of access to the 
courts.  Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 122 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The 
right of access to the courts, however, is limited to cases in which inmates “attack 
their sentences, directly or collaterally, and . . . challenge the conditions of their 
confinement.  Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the 
incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and 
incarceration.”  Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996).  Because Tormasi‟s 
complaints about his ability to pursue patent matters do not fall into one of these 
categories, we agree that he failed to state an access to the courts claims.  Cf. 
Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2003) 
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Administrator.”  N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(.705).  Tormasi does not contend that he has a 
constitutional right to conduct business activities while incarcerated.  See French v. 
Butterworth, 614 F.2d 23, 24 (1st Cir. 1980) (rejecting prisoner‟s claim that he had a 
constitutional right to engage in business activities).  Nor does Tormasi allege that the 
prison regulation lacks a reasonable relation to legitimate penological interests.  Abu-
Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that “[t]here are no doubt many 
businesses or professions, which if practiced within the prison, would necessarily burden 
prison officials or other inmates.”).  Instead, he suggests that his patent application does 
not implicate business activities.  While we generally agree that the submission of a 
patent application does not involve a business activity in all circumstances, see Jerry-El 
v. Beard, No. 10-3031, 2011 WL 989856, at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 22, 2011) (stating that “it 
does not appear that exercising [the] right [to register a copyright] necessarily constitutes 
engaging in a business activity”), the record in this case indicates that Tormasi‟s conduct 
falls within the ambit of that prohibited by the regulation. 
 In his complaint, Tormasi explained that he had previously filed with the USPTO 
two patent applications bearing the title “striping data simultaneously across multiple 
platter services.”  He then assigned to ADS all his interest in the patent applications.  In 
2008, the USPTO issued a patent, which lists Tormasi as the inventor and ADS as the 
assignee.  Based on the confiscation of paperwork pertaining to the patent and ADS, 
Tormasi alleged that he was “unable to directly or indirectly benefit from his intellectual-
                                                                                                                                                             
(explaining that “a prisoner has no constitutional right of access to the courts to 
litigate an unrelated civil [personal injury] claim”).      
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property assets, either by selling all or part of ADS; by exclusively or non-exclusively 
licensing [the] patent to others; by using ADS or [the] patent as collateral for obtaining 
personal loans or standby letters of credit; or by engaging in other monetization 
transactions involving ADS or its intellectual-property assets.”  Notably, Tormasi stated 
that he “intends to assign his confiscated provisional application and any derivate patents 
to plaintiff ADS . . . .”  Under these circumstances, we conclude that the District Court 
did not err in holding that Tormasi‟s intentions regarding the unfiled patent application 
qualified under the regulation as “commencing or operating a business or group for 
profit.”  Accordingly, we conclude that the confiscation of the unfiled patent application 
did not violate his statutory or constitutional rights.    
 Tormasi also alleges that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide him with 
“the right of access to [the] USPTO.”  We disagree, as neither Amendment provides a 
“right of access” in these circumstances.  Those Amendments do, however, protect 
deprivations of property, although “determining what constitutes the impairment of a 
protected property interest for purposes of due process . . . is a distinct inquiry from 
determining what constitutes a taking for purposes of the Takings Clause.  Burns v. PA 
Dep‟t of Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 285 n.3 (3d Cir. 2008).  The Fifth Amendment, made 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, proscribes the taking of 
private property for public use without just compensation.  U.S. Const. amend. V, XIV; 
Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 2001).  Because Tormasi‟s property 
was confiscated as contraband pursuant to New Jersey statute and regulation, he is not 
entitled to compensation pursuant to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  See 
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Savko v. Rollins, 749 F. Supp. 1403, 1412-14 (D. Md. 1990) (holding that, under prison 
regulation, “the State may confiscate property not for the beneficial use of the public, but 
rather as a quintessential police power function:  the orderly and secure operation of the 
State‟s prisons”).  In addition, Tormasi failed to state a claim for a deprivation of 
property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment because an 
adequate post-deprivation remedy for the loss exists.  Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 
533 (1984); see also Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 
2000) (holding that prison‟s grievance program and internal review provide an adequate 
post-deprivation remedy to satisfy due process).  
 For the reasons given, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
